We report an experiment in which each subject repeatedly plays a game with a
unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies against some computer-implemented mixed strategy. The results indicate subjects are successful at detecting and exploiting
deviations from Nash equilibrium. However, there is heterogeneity in subject behavior
and performance. We present a one variable model of dynamic random belief formation which rationalizes observed heterogeneity and other features of the data.
By: Jason Shachat, J. Todd Swarthout
Published in: RC22699 in 2003
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