Secure Distributed DNS

A correctly working Domain Name System (DNS) is essential for the Internet. Due to its significance and because of deficiencies in its current design, the DNS is vulnerable to a wide range of attacks. This paper presents the design and implementation of a secure distributed name service. Our service
is able to provide fault tolerance and security even in the presence of a fraction of corrupted servers, avoiding any single point of failure. It further solves the problem of storing zone secrets online in a way that does not leak them to a corrupted server, while still supporting secure dynamic updates. Our service uses state-machine replication and threshold cryptography. We present results from experiments performed using a prototype implementation on the Internet in realistic setups. The results
show that our design achieves the required assurances while servicing most frequent requests in reasonable time.

By: Christian Cachin and Asad Samar

Published in: RZ3509 in 2003


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