Web clients have evolved into user−level operating systems. They run applications from friendly and hostile providers side by side, often within a single process address space. This presents a poor match for legacy operating systems that assign application privileges based on local user identities, and that implement isolation domains with process granularity. This report reviews a number of techniques for contemporary systems that can partition an application into trusted and untrusted parts. These techniques can enforce different policies for different applications that run on behalf of the same user, even when the applications become corrupted.
By: Wietse Venema
Published in: RC24725 in 2009
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