Simultaneous online auctions can lead to greater efficiency in the market than isolated ones as the global valuations could be maximized. We present a case for the bundling problem where the items a bidder desires can be grouped into independent bundles. We show that such valuations can be efficiently allocated by a local policy and present a formulation for it which can be statically verified. Finally, we also show that why a general multi-item auction can not be efficiently held.
By: Akshat Verma, Rahul Garg
Published in: RI01004 in 2001
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