Transactions on online markets require a great deal of trust among anonymous
trading partners. To mitigate some of the risks involved in anonymous transactions,
several online market sites have implemented reputation management mechanisms that differ in structure and probably functionality. In a series of experiments, this study
examines the impact of two simple reputation management mechanisms on the evolution of trust and trustworthiness in a repeated trust game among strangers.
By: Claudia Keser
Published in: RC22533 in 2002
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