Multiattribute auctions extend traditional auction settings. In addition to price, multiattribute auctions allow negotiation over non-price attributes such as weight, color, terms-of-delivery, and promise to improve market efficeincy in markets with configurable goods. Multiattribute auctions also provide quite general purpose negotiation mechanisms, for example over the terms of a contracting relationship. We propose a family of iterative primal-dual based multiattribute auction mechanisms, for reverse auction settings with one buyer and many sellers. The auctions support incremental preference revelation from both the buyer and the sellers. The auctions are price-directed, and a straightforward myopic best-response strategy is in equilibrium for sellers, assuming a class of consistent buyer strategies. Moreover, the auctions are efficient with a truthful buyer, and we quantify the maximal possible gain to a buyer
from deviating from a truthful strategy.
By: David Parkes,Jayant Kalagnanam
Published in: RC22661 in 2002
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION NOTICE:
This Research Report is available. This report has been submitted for publication outside of IBM and will probably be copyrighted if accepted for publication. It has been issued as a Research Report for early dissemination of its contents. In view of the transfer of copyright to the outside publisher, its distribution outside of IBM prior to publication should be limited to peer communications and specific requests. After outside publication, requests should be filled only by reprints or legally obtained copies of the article (e.g., payment of royalties). I have read and understand this notice and am a member of the scientific community outside or inside of IBM seeking a single copy only.
Questions about this service can be mailed to reports@us.ibm.com .