Recent advances in proving the security of browser-based identity federation protocols do not necessarily carry over to real-world deployments of the protocols proven secure. The protocols are not executed by a single well-defined protocol machine, but by the cooperation of multiple complex products. Thus, formal verification faces a vast complexity rendering it useless. To gain confidence in real world deployments of federated identity protocols in spite of this obstacle, we systematically derive black-box test cases from the precise protocol specification of a federated identity protocol proven secure.
By: Thomas Gross, Birgit Pfitzmann
Published in: RZ3732 in 2009
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