Symmetric Encryption in a Simulatable Dolev-Yao Style Cryptographic Library

Recently we solved the long-standing open problem of justifying a Dolev-Yao type model of cryptography as used in virtually all automated protocol provers under active attacks. The justification
was done by defining an ideal system handling Dolev-Yao-style terms and a cryptographic realization
with the same user interface, and by showing that the realization is as secure as the ideal system in the
sense of reactive simulatability. This definition encompasses arbitrary active attacks and enjoys general composition and property-preservation properties. Security holds in the standard model of cryptography and under standard assumptions of adaptively secure primitives.
A major primitive missing in that library so far is symmetric encryption. We show why symmetric encryption is harder to idealize in a way that allows general composition than existing primitives in this library. We discuss several approaches to overcome these problems. For our favorite approach we provide a detailed provably secure idealization of symmetric encryption within the given framework for
constructing nested terms.