We present an efficient dual algorithm for solving the constrained Nash equilibrium problem over bipartite networks. This problem models selfish routing on networks. In the case of quadratic payoff functions for each agent, we provide an O(n log n) algorithm, where n is the number of agents in the game. This complexity bound improves known results for this class of problems.
By: D. Towsley, L. Wynter
Published in: RC23828 in 2005
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