

# IBM Research Report

## Effective Typestate Verification in the Presence of Aliasing

Stephen Fink, Eran Yahav, Nurit Dor\*, G. Ramalingam, Emmanuel Geay

IBM Research Division  
Thomas J. Watson Research Center  
P.O. Box 704  
Yorktown Heights, NY 10598

\*IBM Research Division  
Haifa Research Laboratory  
Mt. Carmel 31905  
Haifa, Israel



Research Division

Almaden - Austin - Beijing - Haifa - India - T. J. Watson - Tokyo - Zurich

# Effective Tpestate Verification in the Presence of Aliasing

Stephen Fink<sup>1</sup> Eran Yahav<sup>1</sup> Nurit Dor<sup>2</sup> G. Ramalingam<sup>1</sup> Emmanuel Geay<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>IBM T.J. Watson Research Center  
{sfink,eyahav,grama,egeay}@us.ibm.com

<sup>2</sup>IBM Haifa Research Lab  
nurit@il.ibm.com

## Abstract

This paper addresses the challenge of sound tpestate verification, with acceptable precision, for real-world Java programs.

We present a novel framework for verification of tpestate properties, including several new techniques to precisely treat aliases without undue performance costs. In particular, we present a flow-sensitive, context-sensitive, integrated verifier that utilizes a parametric abstract domain combining tpestate and aliasing information. To scale to real programs without compromising precision, we present a staged verification system in which faster verifiers run as early stages which reduce the workload for later, more precise, stages.

We have evaluated our framework on a number of real Java programs, checking correct API usage for various Java standard libraries. The results show that our approach scales to hundreds of thousands of lines of code, and verifies correctness for over 95% of the potential points of failure.

## 1. Introduction

Statically checking if programs satisfy specified safety properties can help identify defects early in the development cycle, thus increasing productivity, reducing development costs, and improving quality and reliability.

Tpestate [32] is an elegant framework for specifying a class of temporal safety properties. Tpestates can encode correct usage rules for many common libraries and application programming interfaces (APIs) (e.g. [33, 2]). For example, tpestate can express the property that a Java program should not read data from `java.net.Socket` until the socket is connected.

This paper addresses the challenge of tpestate verification, with acceptable precision, for real-world Java programs.

We focus on sound verification; if the verifier reports no problem, then the program is guaranteed to satisfy the desired properties. However, if the verifier reports potential problems, they may or may not indicate actual program errors. Imprecise analysis can lead a verifier to produce “false positives”: reported problems that do not indicate an actual error. Users will quickly reject a verifier that produces too many false positives.

While the most sophisticated and precise analyses can reduce false positives, such analyses typically do not scale to real programs. Real programs typically rely on large and complex support-

ing libraries, which the analyzer must process in order to reason about program behavior.

This paper presents several new tpestate verification techniques, ranging from the simple but imprecise, to the fairly precise but somewhat expensive. We also present a staged tpestate verification approach, which exploits these verifiers of varying cost/precision trade-offs. Early stages employ the efficient but imprecise analyses; subsequent stages employ progressively more expensive, and precise, techniques. Each progressively more precise stage focuses on verifying only “parts” of the program that previous stages failed to verify.

The key technical challenge facing tpestate verification for Java concerns pointer aliasing. Since all structured data in Java is heap-allocated, almost all interesting operations involve pointer dereferencing. Further, Java libraries encourage layers of encapsulation around data, which leads to multiple levels of pointer dereferencing. In order to prove that a program manipulates an object correctly, the verifier must cut through the tangle of alias relationships by which the program manipulates the object of interest.

Researchers have developed a variety of extremely efficient flow-insensitive may-alias (pointer) analysis techniques (e.g. [10, 21]). Unfortunately, may-alias analysis is inadequate for most tpestate verification problems, which require strong updates [6]. To support strong updates and more precise alias analysis, we present a framework to check tpestate properties by solving a flow-sensitive, context-sensitive dataflow problem on a combined domain of tpestate and pointer information. As is well-known [9], a combined domain allows a more precise solution than could be obtained by solving each domain separately. Furthermore, the combined domain allows the framework to concentrate computational effort on alias analysis only where it matters to the tpestate property. This concentration allows more precise alias analysis than would be practical if applied to the whole program.

### 1.1 Contributions

The main contributions of this paper are:

- a flow-sensitive, context-sensitive, integrated verifier that utilizes a parametric abstract domain that combines tpestate and points-to abstractions.
- two new techniques to handle destructive updates, utilizing information from a preceding flow-insensitive may points-to analysis. Specifically,

a *uniqueness* analysis that can strengthen the results of the may points-to analysis to support “strong updates” under certain conditions, and

a *focus* operation, similar in spirit to the one used in shape analysis [31], that enables the analysis to use strong updates in certain cases. Though inspired by shape analysis techniques, our focus operation applies to a more efficient, abstract domain,




Figure 1. Partial typestate specification for `java.net.Socket`.

and results in analyses that are orders of magnitude more scalable than typical shape analyses.

- an empirical evaluation of the efficiency and precision of various verification techniques. The empirical results shed light on the relative importance of various techniques for treating aliases, and demonstrate the validity of a staged approach.

Our implementation handles the full Java language, excluding concurrency, subject to caveats described regarding dynamic language features such as reflection. The experimental results show that the staged solver verifies correctness for over 95% of the potential points of failure, usually running in less than 20 minutes across a suite of moderately-sized programs.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Sec. 2 provides an informal overview of the various challenges in typestate verification, and sketches our solutions. Sec. 3, Sec. 4 and Sec. 5 present the abstractions and techniques formally. Sec. 6 presents the empirical evaluation, and Sec. 7 reviews related work.

## 2. Overview

### 2.1 Typestate Verification

A typestate property can be specified using a finite state automaton. States in the automaton correspond to typestates which an object can occupy during execution. The automaton also contains a designated typestate *err* corresponding to an erroneous state of the object. Transitions in the automaton correspond to *observable operations* that may change the object’s typestate. In this paper, we focus on observable operations corresponding to method invocations. The goal of typestate checking is to statically verify that no object reaches its error typestate during any program execution.

Fig. 1 shows a finite state automaton providing a partial specification for the `java.net.Socket` API. This automaton shows, for example, that calling `getInputStream()` is only legal after a preceding call to `connect()`.

Fig. 2 presents a program that exercises Java Sockets, I/O streams, and Iterators. Our goal is to verify that the program

- never calls `getInputStream()` or `getOutputStream()` on a `Socket` unless it is *connected*,
- never calls `read()` on a *closed* stream, and
- always calls `hasNext()` on an `Iterator` before calling `next()`.

In the example program, some typestate properties (e.g. Iterators) could be verified relatively easily by local, intra-procedural reason-

```
class Sender {
  public static Socket createSocket() {
    return new Socket();
  }
  public static Collection createSockets() {
    Collection result = new LinkedList();
    for (int i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
      result.add(new Socket());
    }
    return result;
  }
  public static Collection readMessages() throws IOException {
    Collection result = new ArrayList();
    FileInputStream f = new FileInputStream("/tmp/foo.txt");
    // ...
    f.read();
    // ...
    return result;
  }
  public static void talk(Socket s) throws IOException {
    Collection messages = readMessages();
    PrintWriter o = new PrintWriter(s.getOutputStream(), true);
    for (Iterator it=messages.iterator(); it.hasNext();) {
      Object message = it.next();
      o.print(message);
    }
    o.close();
  }
  public static void example() throws IOException {
    InetAddress ad=InetAddress.getByName("tinyurl.com/cqaje");
    Socket handShake = createSocket();
    handShake.connect(new InetSocketAddress(ad, 80));
    InputStream inp = handShake.getInputStream();

    Collection sockets = createSockets();
    for (Iterator it = sockets.iterator(); it.hasNext();) {
      Socket s = (Socket) it.next();
      s.connect(new InetSocketAddress(addr, 80));
      talk(s);
    }
    talk(handShake);
  }
}
```

Figure 2. Program with correct usages of common APIs.

ing. Unfortunately, any local alias analysis can be easily defeated by unknown side effects from procedure calls.

Other properties require more powerful (and costly) techniques. In particular, socket usage in the example requires an interprocedural analysis with relatively precise alias analysis, since the socket objects flow across procedure boundaries and through complex collection data structures.

### 2.2 Outline of our Algorithm

Our verification system is a *composite* verifier built out of several *composable* verifiers of increasing precision and cost. Each verifier can run independently, but the composite verifier stages analyses in order to improve efficiency without compromising precision. The early stages use the faster verifiers to reduce the workload for later, more precise, stages.

All of our verifiers use the results of a preceding flow-insensitive, selectively context-sensitive subset-based pointer analysis. This analysis produces a conservative approximation of the heap, and induces a partition of concrete objects into *abstract objects*; as is typical, the pointer analysis creates names for abstract objects based on static allocation sites and the governing context-sensitivity policy<sup>1</sup>. The flow-insensitive alias analysis can be performed relatively efficiently, and scales to large programs (e.g. [21, 24]).

Given a program and a typestate property, we consider all operations in the program that may cause a transition to an error state as

<sup>1</sup> Sec. 6 gives details on our implementation’s context-sensitivity policy.




Figure 3. Overview of framework stages.

*points of potential failure (PPF)*. We consider a pair  $(o, p)$  where  $o$  is an abstract object, and  $p$  a point of potential failure, as a separate verification problem. We refer to such pairs as *potential failure pairs*. We define a *verification scope* to be a set of potential failure pairs.

Our verification system starts by initializing the verification scope to contain all matching pairs of abstract tpestate objects and potential points of failure. The verification scope is then gradually reduced by a sequence of stages, as shown in Fig. 3. Each stage may successfully eliminate potential failure pairs by verifying for a pair  $(o, p)$  that a failure cannot occur for objects represented by  $o$  at the point  $p$ .

Each composable verifier in our framework exploits *separation* [11, 35]: it performs the tpestate checking separately for each abstract object of the appropriate type in the program. It accepts as a parameter a verification scope which holds information from the preceding stages about which potential failure pairs remain unverified.

Each verifier restricts its attention to the verification scope, and produces an updated verification scope for the subsequent phase. The system reports any potential failure pairs that remain after the last stage as potential errors.

In the following discussion we briefly describe each of these stages. Later, we present a more detailed description of the algorithms.

### 2.2.1 Flow-Insensitive Feasibility Checking

Prior to any flow-sensitive analysis, the first stage prunes the verification scope using an extremely efficient flow-insensitive error-path feasibility check. The flow-insensitive pointer analysis provides the set of observable operations that may occur for each abstract object. The flow-insensitive verifier determines if it is possible for the abstract object to reach the *err* state in the tpestate automaton, using this set of operations.

Any abstract object that does not exhibit a feasible error-path could be considered as verified.

In our running example, the `FileInputStream` object allocated in `readMessages()` is pruned at this stage, as the program never invokes `close()` for this abstract object, and thus it can never reach an error state (for “`read()` after `close()`”).

This stage, however, is unable to verify the correct usage of the `Iterators` or `Sockets` in the example program.

### 2.2.2 Intraprocedural Verifier

The intraprocedural verifier is a flow-sensitive verifier that restricts the scope of each verification attempt to a single procedure. The verification starts at the beginning of each procedure assuming an arbitrary unknown initial context (state). Method calls are treated conservatively, without analyzing the method. This essentially works well for “local” objects, which are pointed-to by local variables only. The intraprocedural verifier uses the same abstraction as the integrated verifier (see Sec. 2.2.4 and Sec. 5).

When the intraprocedural verifier is able to verify all uses of an abstract object in the program, we can avoid interprocedural verification for that object. This is often the case for tpestate objects that do not escape the method in which they are allocated.

For example, the intraprocedural verifier can verify that all `Iterators` in our running examples are used correctly. Applying the

intraprocedural verifier as an early stage eliminates the need for verification of the `Iterators` in the running example by the latter, more expensive interprocedural solvers.

### 2.2.3 Supporting Strong Updates: Uniqueness Analysis

While a flow-insensitive alias analysis suffices to check feasibility of an error-path (as in Sec. 2.2.1), it generally does not suffice for verifying tpestate properties. A flow-insensitive analysis produces only *may alias* information and not *must alias* information. Therefore, an analyzer that directly uses the results of a flow-insensitive analysis must use “weak updates” to handle assignments and operations via a pointer.

Using “weak updates” precludes verification of many tpestate properties. For example, it is insufficient for verifying the tpestate property of Fig. 1. Using only *may alias* information, the analyzer cannot guarantee that a `connect()` operation occurs on the same concrete object as a subsequent `getInputStream()` operation. Hence, such analysis cannot verify this property.

We now present a verifier that is still based on flow-insensitive alias analysis, but uses a novel *uniqueness analysis* to allow strong updates in some scenarios.

Consider the invocation of a method, via a pointer  $p$ , that may alter the tpestate of the receiver object. If the following two conditions hold, then the analysis can apply a strong update to change the tpestate of the receiver object:

- the points-to set for  $p$  consists of a single *abstract* object
- this *abstract* object represents a single *concrete* object<sup>2</sup>.

Consider an abstract object  $S$  representing a particular (context-sensitive) allocation site  $A$ . This abstract object represents all concrete objects that are allocated at  $A$ . The Unique solver performs a flow- and context-sensitive analysis with a simple abstraction to determine if more than one object allocated at  $A$  can be simultaneously alive. If not, then the abstract object  $S$  represents at most one concrete object at that program point, and the verifier can exploit strong updates at that point if condition (a) mentioned above also holds.

For example, the Unique verifier can verify the *hasNext/next* property for all iterators in the running example. Note, in particular, that the unique verifier verifies the correct usage of the iterator in the `talk(...)` method, even though program execution will witness more than one concrete object allocated at this single allocation site. This approach can similarly verify correct usage of the `socket handShake`.

*Uniqueness analysis* is of general use in our framework, and later stages incorporate the technique. This novel analysis compares favorably to existing techniques for computing unique abstract locations, as it relies on flow- and context-sensitive analysis of a pruned program with respect to the tracked abstract object (see discussion in Sec. 7). Results in Sec. 6 indicate that this analysis is often sufficient for verifying as much as 80% of the potential points of failure.

### 2.2.4 Integrated Verifier

The Integrated verifier improves upon the Unique verifier by performing flow- and context-sensitive verification with an abstraction that combines aliasing information with tpestate information. The use of a combined domain is more precise than separately performing tpestate checking and flow-sensitive alias analysis, as is common with abstract interpretation over combined domains [9].

<sup>2</sup>For purposes of tpestate checking, we may safely ignore the possibility of the pointer  $p$  being null, which will result in a null-pointer dereference exception. If desired, null-pointer checking is done separately.

For example, flow-sensitivity of alias information enables stronger-updates in cases such as the one below, where the Unique verifier fails because the abstract file object does not qualify as unique.

```
Collection files = ...
while (...) {
  File f = new File();
  files.add(f);
  f.open();
  f.read();
}
```

Since all our verifiers exploit separation, it suffices to focus on the problem of verifying usage for a single abstract object. The Integrated verifier utilizes an abstract domain that captures information about the tpestate of the given abstract object, as well as information about a set  $M$  of pointer access paths that definitely point to the given abstract object, and a set  $MN$  of pointer access paths that definitely do not point to the given abstract object. The domain also includes a boolean flag indicating if there may exist other access paths, not mentioned in  $M$ , that may point to the given abstract object. Sec. 5 presents a more complete description of the abstraction.

A key element of the integrated verifier's abstraction is the use of a *focus* operation [31], which is used to dynamically (during analysis) make distinctions between objects that the underlying basic points-to analysis does not distinguish. For example, consider the loop in the method `example()` in our running example. The verifier utilizes two or more abstract objects to represent the set of all (5) `Socket` objects created by the `createSockets()` method (even though the flow-insensitive pointer analysis represents them by a single abstract object): one abstract object represents the `Socket` pointed to by `s`, and the other abstract objects represent the remaining `Sockets`.

This enables the use of strong updates, allowing verification for all `Sockets` in the running example, despite their flow through a collection and across procedures.

### 3. Tpestate Checking Framework

This section presents a framework for tpestate checking which enables declaration of different levels of abstractions.

First, we sketch an instrumented concrete semantics for this problem. Intuitively, given a tpestate property, our semantics instruments the program state,  $state^h$  to include for every object,  $o^h$ , its tpestate from the property definition. The instrumented semantics verifies that an object never reaches its error tpestate.

Next, we present a *parameterized* conservative abstraction that allows us to define the family of abstractions used by the various verifiers in our framework.

#### 3.1 Instrumented Concrete Semantics

We assume a standard concrete semantics which defines a program state and evaluation of an expression in a program state. The semantic domains are defined in a standard way as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
L^h &\in \text{objects}^h \\
v^h &\in \text{Val} = \text{objects}^h \cup \{\text{null}\} \\
\rho^h &\in \text{Env} = \text{VarId} \rightarrow \text{Val} \\
h^h &\in \text{Heap} = \text{objects}^h \times \text{FieldId} \rightarrow \text{Val} \\
state^h = \langle L^h, \rho^h, h^h \rangle &\in \text{States} = 2^{\text{objects}^h} \times \text{Env} \times \text{Heap}
\end{aligned}$$

where  $\text{objects}^h$  is an unbounded set of dynamically allocated objects,  $\text{VarId}$  is a set of local variable identifiers, and  $\text{FieldId}$  is a set of field identifiers.

A *program state* keeps track of the set of allocated objects ( $L^h$ ), an environment mapping local variables to values ( $\rho^h$ ), and a mapping from fields of allocated objects to values ( $h^h$ ).

We also define the notion of an access path as follows: A *pointer path*  $\gamma \in \Gamma = \text{FieldId}^*$  is a (possibly empty) sequence of field identifiers. The empty sequence is denoted by  $\epsilon$ . We use the shorthand  $f^k$  where  $f \in \text{FieldId}$  to mean a sequence of length  $k$  of accesses along a field  $f$ . An *access path*  $p \equiv x.\gamma \in \text{VarId} \times \Gamma$  is a pair consisting of a local variable  $x$  and a pointer path  $\gamma$ .

We denote by *APs* all possible access paths in a program. The  $l$ -value of access path  $p$ , denote by  $state^h[p]$ , is recursively defined using the environment and heap mappings, in the standard manner.

We formally define a tpestate property as follows.

**DEFINITION 3.1.** A tpestate property  $\mathcal{F}$  is represented by a finite state automaton  $\mathcal{F} = \langle \Sigma, \mathcal{Q}, \delta, \text{init}, \mathcal{Q} \setminus \{\text{err}\} \rangle$  where  $\Sigma$  is the alphabet of observable operations,  $\mathcal{Q}$  is the set of states,  $\delta$  is the transition function mapping a state and an operation to a successor state,  $\text{init} \in \mathcal{Q}$  is a distinguished initial state,  $\text{err} \in \mathcal{Q}$  is a distinguished error state for which for every  $\sigma \in \Sigma$ ,  $\delta(\text{err}, \sigma) = \text{err}$ , and all states in  $\mathcal{Q} \setminus \{\text{err}\}$  are accepting states. Given a sequence of operations we say that it is valid when it is accepted by  $\mathcal{F}$ , and invalid otherwise.

Our instrumented concrete semantics instruments every concrete state  $\langle L^h, \rho^h, h^h \rangle$  with an additional mapping  $\text{tpestate}^h: L^h \rightarrow \mathcal{Q}$  that maps an allocated object to its tpestate.

For a given state  $state^h = \langle L^h, \rho^h, h^h \rangle$ , we define a function  $AP^h_{state^h}: L^h \rightarrow 2^{APs}$  as a mapping between allocated objects and the access paths that evaluate to them, i.e.  $AP^h(o^h) = \{e \mid state^h[e] = o^h\}$ . When the state is clear from context, we omit it and simply write  $AP^h(o^h)$ .

A state of the instrumented concrete semantics is therefore a tuple  $\langle L^h, \rho^h, h^h, \text{tpestate}^h \rangle$ .

**EXAMPLE 3.2.** Given the property of Fig. 1, the instrumented concrete state before the first call to `s.connect()` in `example()` contains six objects: one object  $o_0^h$  allocated during the invocation of `createSocket()`, and five other objects  $o_1^h, \dots, o_5^h$ , allocated during the invocation `createSockets()`. The values of  $\text{tpestate}^h$  and the function  $AP^h(o_0^h)$  are:

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{tpestate}^h(o_0^h) &= \text{conn} & AP^h(o_0^h) &= \{\text{handShake}\} \\
\text{tpestate}^h(o_1^h) &= \text{init} & AP^h(o_1^h) &= \{s, \text{sockets.head}\} \\
\text{tpestate}^h(o_i^h) &= \text{init} & AP^h(o_i^h) &= \{\text{sockets.head.next}^{i-1}\} \\
&& \text{where } (i = 2, \dots, 5)
\end{aligned}$$

The instrumented semantics updates the tpestate of the object in a natural way. When the object is first allocated, its tpestate is mapped to the initial state of the tpestate automaton. Then, on every observable event, the object tpestate is updated accordingly.

#### 3.2 Abstract Semantics

The instrumented concrete semantics uses an unbounded set of objects with an unbounded set of (unbounded) access paths. In this section, we describe a parameterized abstract semantics that allows us to conservatively represent the instrumented concrete semantics with various degrees of precision and cost.

Our abstract semantics uses a combination of two representations to abstract heap information: (i) a global heap-graph representation encoding the results of a flow insensitive points-to analysis; (ii) enhanced flow-sensitive must points-to information integrated with tpestate checking.

### 3.2.1 Flow-insensitive May Points-to Information

The first component of our abstraction is a global *heap graph*, obtained through a flow-insensitive, context-sensitive subset based may points-to analysis [3]. This is fairly standard and provides a partition of the set  $objects^h$  into abstract objects. In this discussion, we define an *instance key* to be an abstract object name assigned by the flow-insensitive pointer analysis. The heap graph provides for an access path  $e$ , the set of instance keys it *may* point-to and also the set of access paths that may be aliased with  $e$ .

The heap graph representation of the running example contains two instance keys for type `Socket`: one representing the object allocated in `createSocket`, denoted by  $o_0^h$  in Example 3.2, and another one, for the second allocation site, representing all five objects in the `sockets` collection.

### 3.2.2 Parameterized Tpestate Abstraction

Our parameterized abstract representation uses tuples of the form:  $\langle o, unique, tpestate, AP_{must}, May, AP_{mustNot} \rangle$  where:

- $o$  is an instance key.
- *unique* indicates whether the corresponding allocation site has a single concrete live object.
- *tpestate* is the tpestate of instance key  $o$ .
- $AP_{must}$  is a set of access paths that must point-to  $o$ .
- *May* is true indicates that there are access paths (not in the must set) that may point to  $o$ .
- $AP_{mustNot}$  is a set of access paths that do not point-to  $o$ .

This parameterized abstract representation has four dimensions, for the *length* and *width* of each access path set (must and must-not). The length of an access path set indicates the maximal length of an access path in the set, similar to the parameter  $k$  in  $k$ -limited alias analysis. The width of an access path set limits the number of access paths in this set.

An abstract state is a set of tuples. We observe that a conservative representation of the concrete program state must obey the following properties:

- An instance key can be indicated as unique if it represents a single object for this program state.
- The access path sets (the must and the must-not) do not need to be complete. This does not compromise the soundness of the staged analysis due to the indication of the existence of other possible aliases.
- The must and must-not access path sets can be regarded as another heap partitioning which partitions an instance key into the two sets of access paths: those that a) must alias this abstract object, and b) definitely do not alias this abstract object. If the must-alias set is non-empty, the must-alias partition represents a single concrete object.
- If  $May = false$ , the must access path is complete; it contains all access paths to this object.

This can be formally stated as follows:

DEFINITION 3.3. A tuple  $\langle o, unique, tpestate, AP_{must}, May, AP_{mustNot} \rangle$  is a sound representation of object  $o^h$  at instrumented state  $istate^h$  when:

$$\begin{aligned}
& o = ik(o^h) \\
& \wedge unique \Rightarrow \{x^h \in live(istate^h) \mid ik(x^h) = o\} = \{o^h\} \\
& \wedge tpestate = tpestate^h(o^h) \wedge AP_{must} \subseteq AP^h(o^h) \\
& \wedge (\neg May \Rightarrow (AP_{must} = AP^h(o^h))) \wedge AP_{mustNot} \cap AP^h(o^h) = \emptyset
\end{aligned}$$

where  $ik$  is an abstraction mapping a concrete object to the instance key that represents it, and  $live(istate^h)$  is defined to be  $\{x^h \mid AP^h(x^h) \neq \emptyset\}$ .

DEFINITION 3.4. An abstract state  $istate$  is a sound representation of a concrete state  $istate^h = \langle L^h, \rho^h, h^h, tpestate^h \rangle$  if for every object  $o^h \in L^h$  there exists a tuple in  $istate$  that provides a sound representation of  $o^h$ .

### 3.3 Base Abstraction

The Base (least precise) abstraction is an instance of the parameterized abstraction with zero length and width of both the must and the must-not access path sets. In addition, this abstraction does not track uniqueness. This yields a tpestate checking algorithm, similar to [11] in its alias handling, that cannot verify any property that requires strong updates. For simplicity, we denote each tuple in this abstraction as  $\langle o, tpestate \rangle$

EXAMPLE 3.5. A base abstraction representing the concrete state described in Example 3.2 contains two instance keys:  $o_0$  representing  $o_0^h$  and  $o_{1..5}$  representing the five objects  $o_i^h, i = 1, 2, ..5$  in the `sockets` collection and the following three tuples:  $\langle o_0, init \rangle, \langle o_0, conn \rangle, \langle o_{1..5}, init \rangle$ .

This analysis is an iterative flow- and context-sensitive propagation, that tracks tuples starting with an initial  $\langle o, init \rangle$  generated at an allocation. The analysis only needs to handle observable operations and propagates tuples according to tpestate changes. The result of an observable operation associated with event  $op$  on the tuple  $\langle o, tpestate \rangle$  are two tuples: The previous tuple and the tuple  $\langle o, \delta(tpestate, op) \rangle$ . Tuples are never removed; all operations are handled as weak updates. The first tuple in Example 3.5 demonstrates the results of a weak-update. It represents that  $o_0^h$ , in Example 3.2, may be in the *init* state, which is not feasible in any concrete state at this program point.

## 4. Uniqueness Analysis

The Unique verifier extends the Base abstraction, adding an abstraction which determines whether more than one concrete object corresponding to a given instance key can be simultaneously alive. This information allows the verifier to use strong updates under certain conditions. We refer to this analysis as *uniqueness analysis*.

In terms of the abstraction tuples introduced in Sec. 3, the Unique verifier makes use of only the instance key, uniqueness flag, and the tpestate. (Thus the must-point-to set and must-not-point-to set are always empty, and the May flag is always true.) Hence, we will represent each tuple as a triple  $\langle o, unique, tpestate \rangle$ .

The analysis works as follows. The first time an allocation site with an instance key  $k$  is executed (during analysis), it generates the tuple  $\langle k, true, init \rangle$ . If, during the analysis, any tuple  $\langle k, true, s \rangle$  reaches the same (context-sensitive) allocation site, the allocation site will generate the tuple  $\langle k, false, tpestate \rangle$ .

To make the above technique effective for allocation sites that are in a loop, it is necessary to find a way to “kill” the tuples where possible. This verifier utilizes a preliminary liveness analysis, computed prior to tpestate checking, that determines a conservative approximation of which instance keys may be live at each program point. Whenever a tuple  $p$  for an instance key  $o$  flows to a program point where  $o$  cannot be live,  $p$  can be removed soundly.

The framework admits any form of liveness analysis, which can be plugged into the verifier. Our current implementation uses a simple bottom-up interprocedural liveness analysis, based on the results of the preliminary flow-insensitive, partially context-sensitive pointer analysis.

This approach is effective in two situations. First, *singleton* pattern objects clearly retain their *unique* predicates, and so enjoy

strong updates everywhere. The Java standard libraries use singleton patterns frequently.

Additionally, the liveness analysis allows unique analysis to succeed for a ubiquitous pattern: an allocated object dies before its allocation site executes again. In practice, we have found that a simple liveness analysis catches many of these cases.

For tuples not marked unique, this verifier degenerates into the Base verifier of Sec. 3.3. For example, while uniqueness handles the handshake socket in the running example, uniqueness cannot show that the Sockets in the collection are used correctly. The instance key that represents all the Socket objects in the `sockets` collection is, naturally, not unique. Therefore, when the statement `s.connect()` is analyzed, the tpestate of the abstract Socket object is weakly-updated, indicating that a socket may occupy the `conn` state or the `init` state. These tuples propagate to the statement `s.getOutputStream()` in `talk()`, causing the verifier to imprecisely report a possible error.

Note that in the example, although verifying usage of the handshake object does not rule out errors at any potential points of failure, the staged verifier will remove pairs involving the handshake object from the running verification scope. This would reduce the computational workload for the next stage.

## 5. Integrated Tpestate and Alias Analysis

In this section, we describe two verifiers that make use of the access-path sets in the tuple representation. We first describe the APFocus verifier, our most precise analysis.

### 5.1 Update Functions

The interpretation of an allocation statement “`v = new T()`” with instance key  $o$  will generate a tuple  $\langle o, true, init, \{v\}, false, \emptyset \rangle$  representing the newly allocated object. When `May` is false, the  $AP_{mustNot}$  component is redundant and, hence, initialized to be empty. Table 1 shows how a tuple is transformed by the interpretation of various statements. When a tpestate method is invoked, we can (1) use the  $AP_{mustNot}$  information to avoid changing the tpestate of the tuple where possible, (2) use the  $AP_{must}$  information to perform strong updates on the tuple where possible, and (3) use the uniqueness information also to perform strong updates where possible.

When a tuple reaches the allocation site that created it, we generate two tuples, one representing the newly created object, and one representing the incoming tuple. We change the uniqueness flag to false for reasons explained earlier. For assignment statements, we update the  $AP_{must}$  and  $AP_{mustNot}$  as appropriate.

### 5.2 Focus Operation

We now describe the focus operation, which improves the precision of the analysis. As a motivating example, consider the statement `s.connect()` in the loop in the method `example()` in our running example. We have an incoming tuple representing all of the sockets in the collection, and, hence, we cannot apply a strong update to the tuple, which can subsequently cause a false positive. The *focus* operation replaces the single tuple with two tuples, one representing the object that `s` points to, and another tuple to represent the remaining sockets. Formally, consider an incoming tuple  $\langle o, unique, tpestate, AP_{must}, true, AP_{mustNot} \rangle$  at an observable operation  $e.op()$ , where  $e \notin AP_{must}$ , but  $e$  may point to  $o$  (according to the flow-insensitive points-to solution). The analysis replaces this tuple by the following two tuples:

$$\begin{aligned} &\langle o, unique, tpestate, AP_{must} \cup \{e\}, true, AP_{mustNot} \rangle \\ &\langle o, unique, tpestate, AP_{must}, true, AP_{mustNot} \cup \{e\} \rangle \end{aligned}$$

In the example under consideration, the statement `s.connect()` is reached by the tuple  $\langle o_{1..5}, false, init, \emptyset, true, \emptyset \rangle$ . Focusing re-

places this tuple by the following two tuples:

$$\begin{aligned} &\langle o_{1..5}, false, init, \{s\}, true, \emptyset \rangle \\ &\langle o_{1..5}, false, init, \emptyset, true, \{s\} \rangle \end{aligned}$$

The invocation of `connect()` is analyzed after the focusing. This allows for a strong update on the first tuple and no update on the second tuple resulting in the two tuples:

$$\begin{aligned} &\langle o_{1..5}, false, conn, \{s\}, true, \emptyset \rangle \\ &\langle o_{1..5}, false, init, \emptyset, true, \{s\} \rangle \end{aligned}$$

We remind the reader that the *unique* component tuple merely indicates if multiple objects allocated at the allocation site  $o$  may be simultaneously alive. A tuple such as  $\langle o_{1..5}, false, conn, \{s\}, true, \emptyset \rangle$ , however, represents a single object at this point, namely the object pointed to by  $s$ , which allows us to use a strong update.

### 5.3 Focus and polymorphism

Polymorphism is the distinguishing feature of object-oriented languages; an object’s behavior depends on its concrete type rather than its declared type. Polymorphic call sites, present an interesting and widespread difficulty for the integrated tpestate checking.

Consider the following snippet of code:

```
Collection c = ...
for (Iterator it=c.iterator(); it.hasNext();){
    it.next();
}
```

The Java Collections API often returns one of two Iterator implementations, depending on whether the collection is empty. Thus, the calls to both `hasNext` and `next` are polymorphic. This effectively introduces a path-sensitivity issue, where the two dynamic dispatch sites play the role of correlated branches in traditional path-sensitive discussions.

As in ESP [11], we could introduce path-sensitive predicates that encode the direction of dynamic dispatch. Instead, our focus algorithms exploit information from the tuple to avoid propagation at polymorphic call sites.

In particular, before the call to `hasNext`, if we have the tuple

$$\langle o, false, init, \emptyset, true, \emptyset \rangle$$

then the *focus* operation will result in two tuples after the call to `hasNext`:

$$\begin{aligned} t_1 &= \langle o, false, hasNext, \{it\}, true, \emptyset \rangle \\ t_2 &= \langle o, false, init, \emptyset, true, \{it\} \rangle \end{aligned}$$

The flow functions for *call* edges exploit alias information to avoid propagating tuples down infeasible paths. In particular, the flow function for the call to `it.next` will not propagate  $t_2$  to the `next` operation, since  $t_2$  indicates that `it` *must-not* alias  $o$ . Thus, focus avoids a spurious transition to *err*.

Intuitively, the *focus* operation introduces a notion of path-sensitivity, where a path corresponds to a dynamic dispatch governed by alias relationships for tracked objects.

### 5.4 Discarding Access Paths

As explained earlier, we enforce limits on the length and the number of access paths allowed in the  $AP_{must}$  and  $AP_{mustNot}$  components to keep the number of tuples generated finite. We designed the abstract domain specifically to discard access-path information soundly, allowing heuristics that trade precision for performance but do not sacrifice soundness. This feature is crucial for scalability; the analysis would suffer an unreasonable explosion of dataflow facts if it soundly tracked every possible access path, as in much prior work [13, 23, 7, 14].

We can always safely discard access path elements from the  $AP_{mustNot}$  component, since the flow functions do not rely on the

Stmt S	Resulting abstract tuples
observable operation $e.op()$ as $op \in \Sigma$ where $o \in pt(e)$	$\langle o, unique, \delta(\text{tpestate}, \circ\mathbb{P}), AP_{must}, May, AP_{mustNot} \rangle$ if $e \notin AP_{mustNot} \wedge (e \in AP_{must} \vee May)$ $\langle o, unique, \text{tpestate}, AP_{must}, May, AP_{mustNot} \rangle$ if $e \in AP_{mustNot} \vee (e \notin AP_{must} \wedge \neg(\text{unique} \wedge pt(e) = \{o\}) \wedge May)$
$v = \text{new } T()$ where $o = \text{Stmt } S$	$\langle o, false, \text{tpestate}, AP_{must} \setminus \{v.\gamma \mid \gamma \in \Gamma\}, May, AP_{mustNot} \cup \{v\} \rangle$ $\langle o, false, \text{init}, \{v\}, false, \emptyset \rangle$
$v = \text{null}$	$\langle o, unique, \text{tpestate}, AP_{must} \setminus \{v.\gamma \mid \gamma \in \Gamma\}, May, AP_{mustNot} \cup \{v\} \rangle$
$v.f = \text{null}$	$\langle o, unique, \text{tpestate}, AP_{must} \setminus \{e'.f.\gamma \mid \text{mayAlias}(e', v), \gamma \in \Gamma\}, May, AP_{mustNot} \cup \{v.f\} \rangle$
$v = e$	$\langle o, unique, \text{tpestate}, AP_{must} \cup \{v.\gamma \mid e.\gamma \in AP_{must}\}, May, AP_{mustNot} \setminus \{v \mid e \in AP_{mustNot}\} \rangle$
$v.f = e$	$AP'_{must} := AP_{must} \cup \{v.f.\gamma \mid e.\gamma \in AP_{must}\}$ $\langle o, unique, \text{tpestate}, AP'_{must}, May \vee \exists v.f.\gamma \in AP'_{must}, p \in AP \mid \text{mayAlias}(v, p) \wedge p.f.\gamma \notin AP'_{must}, AP_{mustNot} \setminus \{v.f \mid e \in AP_{mustNot}\} \rangle$

**Table 1.** Transfer functions for statements indicating how an incoming tuple  $\langle o, unique, \text{tpestate}, AP_{must}, May, AP_{mustNot} \rangle$  is transformed, where  $pt(e)$  is the set of instance keys pointed-to by  $e$  in the flow-insensitive solution,  $v \in \text{VarId}$ .  $\text{mayAlias}(e_1, e_2)$  iff pointer analysis indicates  $e_1$  and  $e_2$  may point to the same instance key.

must-not set being complete. Additionally, we can safely discard elements from the  $AP_{must}$  component by setting the  $May$  component to be true, indicating that the  $AP_{must}$  set does not contain all possible aliases.

There are a variety of possible heuristic options for limiting the number of tuples. For example, ESP’s “property simulation” introduced lossy joins, to merge tuples that do not differ in the tpestate property of interest [11].

Our current implementation uses a different heuristic. It discards the prior  $AP_{mustNot}$  paths when applying a *focus* operation, maintaining the more precise information from the most recent *focus*. This is based on intuition that in most cases the extra precision from *focus* will manifest at the next tpestate change. This heuristic avoids a common exponential blowup in state due to a sequence of focus operations, and seems to perform well in practice.

## 5.5 The APMust Verifier

APMust is a simpler version of APFocus engine that makes use of the  $AP_{must}$  component, but not the  $AP_{mustNot}$  component. Thus, the  $AP_{mustNot}$  component is always an empty set in this abstraction. Since it does not use the  $AP_{mustNot}$ , it does not use focus either (since focus is ineffective without the  $AP_{mustNot}$ ). Other aspects of this engine, such as the transfer functions, can be obtained in a straightforward way from the description of APFocus.

We include the APMust verifier for comparison in the next section, to help evaluate the contribution of the focus operation.

## 6. Experimental Results

### 6.1 Implementation

The preliminary flow-insensitive pointer analysis provides a mostly context-insensitive field-sensitive Andersen’s analysis [3], enhanced with a selective object sensitivity policy [26] to disambiguate contents of Java collection classes and I/O stream containers. The pointer analysis relies on an SSA register-transfer language representation of each method, which gives a measure of flow-sensitivity for points-to sets of local variables [20]. The pointer analysis names each context-sensitive allocation site as an instance key, and builds the call graph on-the-fly.

The analysis deals with reflection by tracking objects to casts, as in [17, 25]. When an object is created by a reflective call (e.g. `newInstance`), the analysis assumes (unsoundly) that the object will be cast to a declared type before being accessed. The analysis tracks these flows, and infers the type of object created by `newInstance` based on the declared type of relevant casts. While technically unsound, we believe that this approximation is accurate for the vast majority of reflective factory methods in Java programs.

The pointer analysis adds one-level of call-string context to calls to various library factory methods, `arraycopy`, and `clone`

statements, which tend to badly pollute pointer flow precision if handled without context-sensitivity. The system uses a substantial library of models of native code behavior for the standard libraries.

The flow-sensitive combined tpestate and alias analysis builds on a general Reps-Horwitz-Sagiv (RHS) IFDS tabulation solver implementation [29]. We have enhanced the standard IFDS solver in straightforward ways to handle Java’s exceptional control-flow and polymorphic dispatch without undue precision loss.

### 6.2 Sparsification

To make the analysis scale, we rely on a lightweight sparsification[28] optimization prior to solving the IFDS problem. Consider an integrated verifier using access-paths bounded by depth  $k$ . We first consult the flow-insensitive points-to graph to conservatively determine all program variables that may appear in access-paths of depth at most  $k$ , which point to tpestate objects of interest for a given property. Next, we perform a context-insensitive mod-ref analysis over the call graph, to determine those call graph nodes which may write to such variables; call these the *relevant* nodes. We prune the call graph to include *only* those nodes from which some *relevant* node is reachable, since the other nodes cannot modify the IFDS solution.

This pruning is particular important for the LocalFocus verifier. Exploiting the pruning, the LocalFocus verifier can avoid making conservative assumptions for every method call, thus greatly increasing its precision.

We assume that methods from the standard libraries will not directly transition to *err*, and apply sparsification accordingly. Of course, the analysis still must analyze all relevant library code to account for tpestate transitions to non-*err* states, and aliases induced by the libraries.

In the staged verifier, we exploit results from early stages to improve sparsification in latter stages in two ways. First, if an early stage verifies that a particular statement does not transition to *err*, latter stages incorporate this information to improve sparsification. Second, if an early stage proves that a particular abstract object never causes an error, latter stages ignore tuples for that abstract object entirely.

### 6.3 Benchmarks

Table 2 lists the benchmarks employed in this study.

Apache Bcel is a bytecode processing toolkit with a sample verifier. Java\_cup and JLex are a parser generator and lexical analyzer, respectively, for Java. Jbidwatcher is an online auction tool. JHotDraw is a graphics framework for technical and structured graphics. L2j is Multi-User Dungeon game server. Apache lucence is a text search engine. Portecle is a GUI application for managing secure keys and certificates. SPECjvm98 is a collection of client-oriented applications. TVLA is a research vehicle



Benchmark	Classes	Methods	Bytecode Statements	Contexts
bcel	1723	7130	1474264	13725
gj	230	2362	139305	2521
java_cup	123	661	53296	990
jbidwatcher	1182	4994	1029507	7030
jhotdraw	1688	6337	1400640	11203
jlex	111	473	44736	776
jpat-p	64	225	17783	269
kawa-c	612	3027	141527	3438
l2j	838	4247	877077	6438
lucene	1783	6694	1474334	12576
portecle	1800	6737	1481249	13430
rhino-a	196	1293	92225	1645
sablecc-j	391	2144	96201	2747
schroeder-m	1459	5215	1367432	9682
soot-c	665	2764	144554	3272
specjvm98	965	4673	979159	8152
symjpack-t	74	305	80508	351
toba-s	163	760	65415	1169
tvla	346	2077	139474	12874

Table 2. Call graph characteristics for benchmarks.

Name	Description
<b>Enumeration</b>	Call <code>hasNextElement</code> before <code>nextElement</code>
<b>InputStream</b>	Do not read from a <i>closed</i> <code>InputStream</code>
<b>Iterator</b>	Do not call <code>next</code> without first checking <code>hasNext</code>
<b>KeyStore</b>	Always initialize a <code>KeyStore</code> before using it
<b>PrintStream</b>	Do not use a <i>closed</i> <code>PrintStream</code>
<b>PrintWriter</b>	Do not use a <i>closed</i> <code>PrintWriter</code>
<b>Signature</b>	Follow initialization phases for <code>Signatures</code>
<b>Socket</b>	Do not use a <code>Socket</code> until it is <i>connected</i>
<b>Stack</b>	Do not <code>peek</code> or <code>pop</code> an empty <code>Stack</code>
<b>URLConnection</b>	Illegal operation performed when already connected
<b>Vector</b>	Do not access elements of an empty <code>Vector</code>

Table 3. Typestate properties.

for abstract interpretation. The remainder of the benchmarks come from the Ashes suite, described at the Ashes web page <sup>3</sup>.

The Table reports size characteristics restricted to methods discovered by on-the-fly call graph construction. The call graph includes methods from both the application and the libraries; for many programs the size of the program analyzed is dominated by the standard libraries. The table also reports the number of (method) contexts in the call graph. Recall that the context-sensitivity policy models some methods with multiple contexts.

Table 3 lists intuitive descriptions of the typestate properties checked in the experiments.

## 6.4 Methodology

The experiments evaluate the following verification algorithms:

- **FI**: flow-insensitive analysis (Sec. 2.2.1)
- **LocalFocus**: the intraprocedural analysis (Sec. 2.2.2)
- **Base**: the base analysis (Sec. 3.3)
- **Unique**: the analysis using the *unique* reasoning (Sec. 4)
- **APMust**: the integrated analysis without focus (Sec. 5)
- **APFocus**: the integrated analysis with focus (Sec. 5.)
- **Staged**: a staged analysis consisting of three stages: LocalFocus, Unique, and APFocus.

<sup>3</sup><http://www.sable.mcgill.ca/ashes/>

Note that each verifier performs the FI analysis as a first step, since it is extremely fast and can prune the workload based on the “verification scope” passed from the previous stage. The experiments use an access-path depth limit of 1, and unlimited access-path set width<sup>4</sup>.

Each experiment ran in a time limit of 15 minutes for each type-state property. In a few cases, a benchmark/property/verifier combination timed out <sup>5</sup>. When reporting warnings data, we penalize a timed-out run by assigning it the same results as the most precise previous verifier that did not time out. This value represents what a staged verifier could safely report after a phase times out.

All experiments ran on an IBM Intellistation Z pro with two 3.06 GHz Intel Xeon CPUs and 3.62 GB of RAM, running Windows XP. The analysis implementation, consisting of roughly 200,000 lines of Java code, ran on the IBM J2RE 1.4.2 for Windows, with a max heap of 800MB.

## 6.5 Results

Figure 4 shows the percentage of warnings, as a percentage of total number of statements that the callgraph indicates might transition to *err* (points of potential failure (PPF)). The rightmost cluster of bars shows the total number of warnings across all runs. Overall,

- The FI verifier verifies correctness for **30%** of PPFs.
- The LocalFocus verifier verifies correctness for **66%** of PPFs.
- The Base verifier verifies correctness for **75%** of PPFs.
- The Unique verifier verifies correctness for **80%** of PPFs.
- The APMust verifier verifies correctness for **90.6%** of PPFs.
- The APFocus verifier verifies correctness for **95.6%** of PPFs.

By construction, the Staged verifier has the same precision as APFocus. Sec. 6.7 discusses the sources of many false positives.

## 6.6 Performance

Figure 5 reports the running times of the various verifiers across the benchmarks. The results show the expected relative costs of the various verifiers.


**Impact of Staging** The Staged verifier improves performance compared to the APFocus verifier on 8 of the 12 codes where type-state checking takes more than one minute. The performance improvement on these 12 codes from staging ranges from 85% (*jbidwatcher*) to -13% (*lucene*), with a median of 22%. These numbers include effects of the 15 minute timeout described earlier; without the timeout, staging would appear somewhat more effective.

**Impact of Sparsification** We evaluated the sparsification of Sec. 6.2 across all runs of the staged verifier. With sparsification, 70% of supergraphs have fewer than 3500 nodes, 95% have fewer than 25,000 nodes, and 100% have fewer than 40,000 nodes. The corresponding numbers without sparsification are drastically higher: roughly 80% of unpruned supergraphs have more than 125,000 nodes, and 20% have over 290,000 nodes. Overall, sparsification reduces median supergraph size by roughly a factor of 50. We would expect a corresponding reduction in space and running time, if we could run the unpruned verifiers without running out of memory.

**Impact of Initial Pointer Analysis** The precision of the preceding flow-insensitive pointer analysis has a significant impact on performance and precision. A more accurate pointer analysis allows

<sup>4</sup>Experiences with deeper access-paths have not shown significant improvements for our benchmark/property set

<sup>5</sup>*Schroeder/InputStream/APFocus*, *specJvm98/PrintStream/APMust* and *APFocus*, *tvla/Iterator/APMust* and *APFocus*



**Figure 4.** Percentage of warnings out of total number of points of potential failure (PPFs). Results are grouped by a) application, and b) property. Number of PPFs is shown above each group.

better sparsification, more effective live analysis and improved disambiguation overall. We ran many of the analyses with a context-insensitive Andersen-style pointer analysis, without the custom context-sensitivity policies described earlier. Many of the benchmarks timed out on several rules; we conclude that adequate precision in the preceding pointer analysis is vital.

Our context-sensitivity policy employs object-sensitivity for classes from the standard libraries typically relevant to these typestate properties (namely collections and I/O streams). Some benchmarks defeat this object-sensitivity policy by using application-level collections or streams. For example, TVLA uses a library of application-level collections, and specJVM98 uses a reporting library of application-level I/O streams. To handle these cases more effectively, we need to infer a pointer-analysis context-sensitivity


policy for application classes that match typestate properties. Iterative refinement techniques [27, 19] may apply to this problem.

## 6.7 Discussion

Overall, the results show that our combination of techniques is relatively successful and efficient at verifying these typestate properties. The various techniques complement each other, contributing to the effectiveness of the staged verifier.

We have examined, by hand, many of the warnings which our most precise verifier does not eliminate. From inspection, it appears that roughly half of the warnings result from analysis imprecision, and roughly half from overly strict typestate properties.

The analysis imprecisions stem usually from aliasing knots that our current implementation cannot cut through. We expect, in particular, that in the near future we can improve precision by a)



**Figure 5.** Total wallclock time needed to run the analysis. “Setup” indicates the preliminary activities; primarily the preceding flow-insensitive pointer analysis and call graph construction. The rightmost stacked bar in each group represents the running time of the Staged verifier. A T over a group indicates a benchmark that suffered a 15 minute timeout on some property/verifier combination.

access-path tracking for objects that are not tpestate objects, but are likely to point to them, and b) increasing the scope of focus by exploiting inexpensive local alias reasoning. We suspect that substantial improvements in alias precision are within reach, without undue performance compromise.

In many other cases, our verifiers fail to verify a PPF due to failure of the tpestate property to capture all legal behavior, as opposed to solver limitations. For example, our tpestate property for *Vector* does not account for the return value from `Vector.size()`. Many times, application code accesses a *Vector* via statements guarded by a test that `size > 0`. This pattern accounts for many of the false positives for the *Stack* and *Vector* rules. For proper treatment, these APIs require at least range-check analysis, as commonly applied to array-bounds checking (e.g. [18]).

In many cases, programmers deduce from application logic that a particular iterator must have a next element, or a particular collection must not be empty. The tpestate property for a single object does not allow for application logic which ensures, via some back door, that an object occupies a particular tpestate. Designing efficient, effective analysis for more general specifications remains a difficult problem.

## 7. Related Work

Many existing verification frameworks (e.g., [11, 4, 8]) use a two-phased approach, performing points-to analysis as a preceding phase, followed by tpestate checking. This approach only supports weak updates as discussed in Sec. 3.3.

The current version of ESP [13] uses an integrated approach, recording must and may alias information in a flow-sensitive manner. They observe that the may set becomes polluted and expensive to maintain, and even hint toward maintaining a must-not set as a possible future solution. In contrast, our approach adds must-not and also introduces the notions of uniqueness and focus, and uses staging to achieve increased scalability and precision.

DeLine and Fähndrich [12] present a type system for tpestate properties for objects. Their system guarantees that a program that typechecks has no tpestate violations, and provides a modular, sound checker for object-oriented programs. To handle aliasing,

they employ the *adoption* and *focus* operations to a linear type system, as described in [15]. With these operations, the type checker can assume *must-alias* properties for a limited program scope, and thus apply strong updates allowing tpestate transitions. Our approach can prove correctness of a more general class of programs, since a context-sensitive analysis can accept programs for which an expression cannot be assigned a unique type at a given program point. Furthermore, our *focus* operation generates facts that can flow across arbitrary program scopes, in contrast to the limited program scope handled by [15]. On the other hand, our approach is non-modular and thus more expensive.

Aiken et al. [1] present an inference algorithm for inferring *restricted* and *confined* pointers, which they use to enable strong updates. We believe that the *focusing* technique we exploit, inspired by [30], can sometimes achieve a similar effect without explicitly inferring *restricted* and *confined* pointers, and sometimes enable strong updates even when the pointers are not restricted/confined. Further, the uniqueness technique we use provides a somewhat orthogonal, cheap, technique for enabling strong updates.

Field et al. [16] present algorithms based on abstractions that integrate alias and tpestate information, but restricted to shallow programs, with only single-level pointers to tpestate objects.

The parametric shape analysis presented in [31] has served as the basis for very precise verification algorithms, where the verification is integrated with heap analysis (e.g., [35].) These algorithms, however, do not scale well. We plan to extend our staged verifier by adding such precise verifiers as a last stage.

Counter-example guided refinement [5, 22] based approaches have had impressive results in certain domains. But they have so far been less successful in dealing with complex heap manipulation, partly because these approaches attempt to *automatically* derive appropriate heap analyses. Our staged verifier has a “refinement” flavor, but restricted to a fixed set of manually crafted verifiers.

Aliasing of our combined domain resembles previous approaches to flow-sensitive, context-sensitive access-path-based pointer analysis [23, 7]. Emami, Ghiya and Hendren [14] presented a domain that combined may and must points-to information. Our IFDS-based solvers memoize function summaries, similar to Wil-

son and Lam’s partial transfer functions [34]. Our domain differs from these previous works since a) it tracks *must* and *must-not* paths, but not *may*, and b) Java’s strong typing avoids complications arising from pointers to stack locations.

Iterative refinement techniques [27, 19] perform pointer analysis in multiple passes, with a client-independent first pass, followed by subsequent passes using context-sensitivity policies driven by client feedback. In future work we plan to integrate these techniques into our framework, where each typestate solver provides feedback for the next stage’s pointer analysis.

## References

- [1] A. Aiken, J. S. Foster, J. Kodumal, and T. Terauchi. Checking and inferring local non-aliasing. *ACM SIGPLAN Notices*, 38(5):129–140, May 2003. In *Conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation (PLDI)*.
- [2] R. Alur, P. Cerny, P. Madhusudan, and W. Nam. Synthesis of interface specifications for java classes. *SIGPLAN Not.*, 40(1):98–109, 2005.
- [3] L. O. Andersen. *Program Analysis and Specialization for the C Programming Language*. PhD thesis, DIKU, Univ. of Copenhagen, May 1994. (DIKU report 94/19).
- [4] T. Ball, R. Majumdar, T. Millstein, and S. Rajamani. Automatic predicate abstraction of C programs. In *Proc. ACM Conf. on Programming Language Design and Implementation*, pages 203–213, June 2001.
- [5] T. Ball and S. K. Rajamani. The SLAM project: debugging system software via static analysis. *ACM SIGPLAN Notices*, 37(1):1–3, Jan. 2002.
- [6] D. R. Chase, M. Wegman, and F. K. Zadeck. Analysis of pointers and structures. *ACM SIGPLAN Notices*, 25(6):296–310, June 1990. In *PLDI*.
- [7] J.-D. Choi, M. Burke, and P. Carini. Efficient flow-sensitive interprocedural computation of pointer-induced aliases and side effects. In *POPL 93*, pages 232–245, 1993.
- [8] J. Corbett, M. Dwyer, J. Hatcliff, C. Pasareanu, Robby, S. Laubach, and H. Zheng. Bandera: Extracting finite-state models from Java source code. In *Proc. Intl. Conf. on Software Eng.*, pages 439–448, June 2000.
- [9] P. Cousot and R. Cousot. Systematic design of program analysis frameworks. In *Proc. ACM Symp. on Principles of Programming Languages*, pages 269–282, New York, NY, 1979. ACM Press.
- [10] M. Das. Unification-based pointer analysis with directional assignments. *ACM SIGPLAN Notices*, 35(5):35–46, May 2000. In *Conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation (PLDI)*.
- [11] M. Das, S. Lerner, and M. Seigle. ESP: path-sensitive program verification in polynomial time. *ACM SIGPLAN Notices*, 37(5):57–68, May 2002. In *Conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation (PLDI)*.
- [12] R. DeLine and M. Fähndrich. Typestates for objects. In *18th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP)*, volume 3086 of *LNCS*, June 2004.
- [13] N. Dor, S. Adams, M. Das, and Z. Yang. Software validation via scalable path-sensitive value flow analysis. In *ISSTA*, pages 12–22, 2004.
- [14] M. Emami, R. Ghiya, and L. J. Hendren. Context-sensitive interprocedural points-to analysis in the presence of function pointers. *ACM SIGPLAN Notices*, 29(6):242–256, June 1994. In *Conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation (PLDI)*.
- [15] M. Fähndrich and R. DeLine. Adoption and focus: practical linear types for imperative programming. *ACM SIGPLAN Notices*, 37(5):13–24, May 2002. In *Conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation (PLDI)*.
- [16] J. Field, D. Goyal, G. Ramalingam, and E. Yahav. Typestate verification: Abstraction techniques and complexity results. In *Proc. of Static Analysis Symposium (SAS’03)*, volume 2694 of *LNCS*, pages 439–462. Springer, June 2003.
- [17] S. Fink, J. Dolby, and L. Colby. Semi-automatic J2EE transaction configuration. Technical Report RC23326, IBM, 2004.
- [18] R. Gupta. Optimizing array bound checks using flow analysis. *ACM Lett. Program. Lang. Syst.*, 2(1-4):135–150, 1993.
- [19] S. Guyer and C. Lin. Client-driven pointer analysis. In *Proc. of SAS’03*, volume 2694 of *LNCS*, pages 214–236, June 2003.
- [20] R. Hasti and S. Horwitz. Using static single assignment form to improve flow-insensitive pointer analysis. *ACM SIGPLAN Notices*, 33(5):97–105, May 1998. In *Conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation (PLDI)*.
- [21] N. Heintze and O. Tardieu. Ultra-fast aliasing analysis using CLA: A million lines of C code in a second. *ACM SIGPLAN Notices*, 36(5):254–263, May 2001. In *Conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation (PLDI)*.
- [22] T. A. Henzinger, R. Jhala, R. Majumdar, and G. Sutre. Lazy abstraction. In *Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages*, pages 58–70, 2002.
- [23] W. Landi and B. G. Ryder. A safe approximate algorithm for interprocedural aliasing. *ACM SIGPLAN Notices*, 27(7):235–248, July 1992. In *Conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation (PLDI)*.
- [24] O. Lhoták and L. Hendren. Scaling Java points-to analysis using SPARK. In *12th International Conference on Compiler Construction (CC)*, volume 2622 of *LNCS*, pages 153–169, Apr. 2003.
- [25] B. Livshits, J. Whaley, and M. S. Lam. Reflection analysis for java. In *Proceedings of Programming Languages and Systems: Third Asian Symposium, APLAS 2005*, November 2005.
- [26] A. Milanova, A. Rountev, and B. G. Ryder. Parameterized object sensitivity for points-to analysis for java. *ACM Trans. Softw. Eng. Methodol.*, 14(1):1–41, 2005.
- [27] J. Plevyak and A. A. Chien. Precise concrete type inference for object-oriented languages. *ACM SIGPLAN Notices*, 29(10):324–324, Oct. 1994. In *Conference on Object-Oriented Programming Systems, Languages, and Applications (OOPSLA)*.
- [28] G. Ramalingam. On sparse evaluation representations. *Theor. Comput. Sci.*, 277(1-2):119–147, 2002.
- [29] T. Reps, S. Horwitz, and M. Sagiv. Precise interprocedural dataflow analysis via graph reachability. In *Conference record of POPL ’95, 22nd ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages*, pages 49–61, New York, NY, USA, 1995. ACM Press.
- [30] M. Sagiv, T. Reps, and R. Wilhelm. Parametric shape analysis via 3-valued logic. In *Proc. ACM Symp. on Principles of Programming Languages*, pages 105–118, 1999.
- [31] M. Sagiv, T. Reps, and R. Wilhelm. Parametric shape analysis via 3-valued logic. *Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)*, 24(3):217–298, May 2002.
- [32] R. E. Strom and S. Yemini. Typestate: A programming language concept for enhancing software reliability. *IEEE Trans. Software Eng.*, 12(1):157–171, 1986.
- [33] J. Whaley, M. Martin, and M. Lam. Automatic extraction of object-oriented component interfaces. In *Proceedings of the International Symposium on Software Testing and Analysis*, July 2002.
- [34] R. P. Wilson and M. S. Lam. Efficient context-sensitive pointer analysis for C programs. *ACM SIGPLAN Notices*, 30(6):1–12, June 1995. In *Conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation (PLDI)*.
- [35] E. Yahav and G. Ramalingam. Verifying safety properties using separation and heterogeneous abstractions. In *Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN 2004 conference on Programming language design and implementation*, pages 25–34. ACM Press, 2004.